

On building **trustworthy decentralized infrastructure**: Experiences from the BlockChain I/O project

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Work done with (and thanks to) members of my team and collaborators:


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ABOUT ME



RESEARCH (a bird's eye view)

- **Cyber security**
 - Data Privacy & Governance
 - Privacy Enhancing Technologies
 - Risk Management & Transfer
- Data science
 - Graph algorithms & applications
 - NLP applications
- **Distributed systems**
 - Decentralization
 - Self-organization
 - Reliability & Resilience
 - Scalability
- **Distributed Ledgers**
- Socio-technological systems


Talking Points

- Interoperable blockchains for a decentralized, trustworthy infrastructure
 - Cryptographic primitives
 - Atomic swaps with Hashed Time Lock Contracts
 - Self-Sovereign Identities
 - Associated privacy benefits
 - Fine-grained (~role based) access control
 - Commerce/DeFi
 - Applications over multiple interoperable blockchains
 - Multi-chain cryptocurrency collateralized stable-coins
 - Global reputation aggregation


Disclaimers & Acknowledgements

- Thrust of the talk is on **the what**, not the how
- The presented body of work was funded by Ministry of Education (Singapore) through Tier-2 grant, and they were carried out at NTU Singapore
- Some of the work leverage directly or extend third party innovations and artefacts

Background/inspirations: ONDC vision paper



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
Background/inspirations: ONDC vision paper



Background/inspirations: Web 4.0

- **Blockchain and cryptocurrencies** are likely to be the technological building blocks of a decentralized infrastructure (i.e. an infrastructure without the need of a centralised control) that will enable users to interact, buy, sell and trade virtual assets, as well as establish and enforce rules and regulations (Barrera et al., 2023; Lee et al., 2021). Blockchain would provide a trustworthy, transparent and verifiable mean of keeping a secure record of digital ownership of virtual assets (such as virtual real estate, avatars and virtual goods) which could be bought, sold or traded just like physical assets. This is particularly important for virtual economies, where users need to trust that their virtual assets and transactions are secure.

Ref: <https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC133757>




Background: Blockchains


- **Blockchains**
 - Tamper-evident decentralized data structure
 - Immutability
 - Verifiability of records
 - Secure **token** transfers
 - **Contracts** as self-executing codes
- **Silos**
 - Native design of blockchain assumes operating in isolation
 - Independent **decentralized digital marketplaces**

Hierarchy of Needs

- **Desiderata** for a trustworthy decentralized (commerce) infrastructure




Blockchain I/O



BlockChain I/O core tech stack + publications:

- Putting PIEChain, AnonCreds & CroCoDai together: [IEEE Access 2024](#)
- PIEChain: Demonstrated at [ICDCS 2023](#)
- CroCoDai: [ACM DLT 2024](#), some further extension/optimization: [MARBLE 2024](#)
- AnonCreds: [3rd party technology](#) (Hyperledger)
- 1DLT: [Tokenomics 2022](#) (built at QPQ.IO)
- Data governance/confidential data sharing: [TrustCom 2024](#), [PeerJ 2024](#)
- Multi-chain reputation aggregation: [Under review](#)


Blockchain I/O internals



Decoupled Communication & Transaction


- Interactions through Cross-Chain Services CC-SVCs (Kafka based)
 - Reputation system to prevent CC-SVCs abuse
- Transaction semantics: Escrows (**Cross-chain deals**)
- Value volatility mitigation: Stablecoin (CroCoDAI)

Hashed Time Lock Contract




Note: Blockchain I/O implementation supports a more sophisticated escrow variant known as Cross-chain deals


Self-Sovereign Identity



AnonCreds




Access Control




Fine-grained Control?

- **Don't scale well** (on their own)
 - Symmetric key encryption
 - Public key cryptography
 - Proxy re-encryption



Fine-grained Control

- Attribute Base Encryption (ABE)



Fine-grained Control

- Cypher-text Attribute Base Encryption (CP-ABE)
 - Conceptually like traditional access control methods such as [Role-Based Access Control](#).
 - A **user** is described by a set of descriptive **attributes**, and a corresponding **private key** is issued to the user by **an authority**.
 - During encryption, an encryptor associates an **access policy** over **attributes** with the **ciphertext**.

Bethencourt, John, Amit Sahai, and Brent Waters. "Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption." In *IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P 2007)*, 321–34. Berkeley, CA: IEEE, 2007. <https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2007.11>.

Fine-grained Control

- Multi-Authority Cypher-text Attribute Base Encryption (MA-CP-ABE)

- It might not be realistic to have one single authority to manage all attributes.
 - ❖ E.g., an encryptor may want to share data with users who are computer science alumni of University X and currently working as an engineer for Company Y.
 - ❖ The access policy is $P = \text{UnivX.CS} \text{ AND } \text{UnivX.ALU} \text{ AND } \text{CompY.Engineer}$
- Some practicality needs:
 - ❖ Different attribute domains are managed by different authorities.
 - ❖ Expressiveness, efficiency and security are not weaker than that of the single-authority CP-ABE
 - ❖ No authority can independently decrypt any ciphertext

Lewko, Allison, and Brent Waters. “Decentralizing Attribute-Based Encryption.” In *Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2011*, edited by Kenneth G. Paterson, 6632:568–88. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-20465-4_31.

Fine-grained Control

- Multi-Authority Cypher-text Attribute Base Encryption (MA-CP-ABE) **with Policy Hiding**
 - individual authorities do not know the full set of attributes possessed by the recipient

Michalevsky, Yan, and Marc Joye. “Decentralized Policy-Hiding ABE with Receiver Privacy.” In *Computer Security, 2018*, edited by Javier Lopez, Jianying Zhou, and Miguel Soriano, 11099:548–67. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Cham: Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98989-1_27.

- Mitigation (using Multi-party Compute + Zero Knowledge Proofs) of a vulnerability: rogue-key attack


Jingchi Zhang, Anwitaman Datta:

Enhancing Privacy-Preserving Multi-Authority Attribute-Based Encryption: Addressing Rogue-Key Attacks Under Adaptive Corruption of Authorities. [TrustCom 2024](#): 524-531

Jingchi Zhang, Anwitaman Datta:


Blockchain-enabled data governance for privacy-preserved sharing of confidential data. [PeerJ Comput. Sci. 10](#): e2581 (2024)

Fine-grained Control



1DLT internals

Decouple transactions from consensus
- Facilitate on-demand EVM based DLTs




CroCoDAI


Extends ideas from  DAI to accommodate non-Ethereum cryptocurrencies

STABLE COIN

DAI




CroCoDAI



CroCoGator

Reputation Aggregation

- with (some sort of) completeness guarantees



Concluding Remarks

- **Cryptographic primitives**
 - Atomic swaps with Hashed Time Lock Contracts
 - Self-Sovereign Identities (SSI)
 - Associated privacy benefits
 - Fine-grained (like, role based) access control (using ABE)
 - **Caveat:** Our current work with ABE is stand-alone, and it is yet to be integrated with the rest of BlockChain I/O
- **Digital ecosystem/markets/DeFi**
 - Applications over multiple interoperable blockchains
 - **POC/TRL4:** Various forms of auctions, ticket scalping prevention
 - Multi-chain cryptocurrency collateralized stable-coins
 - Global reputation aggregation
- **Code**
 - <https://github.com/ntublockchain/I-O>

Q&A

THANKS

Hvala